Supernaturalism
Abstract
Supernaturalism is the view that moral properties are properties or relations involving divine or supernatural entities. It is obviously not a kind of naturalism, since supernatural entities are by definition not natural. Thus, if you were taking the standard metaethical terms at face value, you would expect it to be a kind of non-naturalism. But it isn't. That's because the field has followed G. E. Moore in excluding what he thought of as “metaphysical” properties from the class of properties he referred to using the term ‘nonnatural.’ This makes the labels a bit misleading, but there is a kind of point to the exclusion, insofar as supernaturalist commitments often parallel those of standard naturalist metaethical views. Hence, supernaturalist views get their own territory on the left-hand side of the chart of metaethical positions in Chapter 1 . The similarities to naturalism will allow this chapter to draw on our earlier discussions of naturalism in explaining supernaturalism and its benefits and burdens.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Ethics
Aesthetics
and Art
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Routledge eBooks
- Pages
- 306–316
- Publication date
- 6 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter