Explaining Civilian Targeting in Expeditionary Counterinsurgency

This chapter sets out the book’s typological framework explaining how international and local contexts would shape the fate of civilians in expeditionary counterinsurgency. Firstly, the chapter specifies the different levels of civilian targeting – the values on the dependent variable – as being moderate (restrictions on civilians’ freedom and property), high (deliberate lethal violence without intent to exterminate civilians), and extreme (intentional extermination of civilians). Secondly, after framing civilian targeting as a form of risk-taking behaviour, the chapter builds on Realism’s tenets in IR and prospect theory’s evidence-based insight that decision-makers – including political and military leaders – are risk-averse to secure gains but risk-tolerant to avoid or recoup perceived losses. Based on that premise, the chapter posits that the counterinsurgent’s understanding of potential losses and its ensuing inclination to take or avoid the risks of a specific level of civilian targeting will vary according to the combinations of two factors that may assume two values each: the counterinsurgent’s perceptions of the external threat environment around the occupied territory – which can be favourable or unfavourable – and local alliance strategy – which can be aligned with a would-be dominant group in the occupied society or neutral. Each of the four possible combinations defines a Scenario, or type, in which a specific level of civilian victimization comes by way of a distinctive pathway. The chapter explains that civilian targeting will be high but not extreme when the counterinsurgent perceives an unfavourable external threat environment and has a neutral local alliance strategy (Scenario 1). A combination of neutral local alliance strategy and favourable perceptions of the external threat environment would foster a moderate level of civilian targeting (Scenario 2). Civilian victimization will be high but not extreme again when the counterinsurgent supports would-be dominant groups in the occupied society, but perceives the external threat environment of the occupied territory as favourable (Scenario 3). Finally, civilian targeting will be extreme when the counterinsurgent supports would-be dominant groups while perceiving the external threat environment as unfavourable (Scenario 4). After clarifying the expected outcome and logic of each Scenario, the chapter sets out observable implications and offers some final reflections on the explanatory possibilities and limits of the typological framework.