French Counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954–1962)

This chapter tests the book’s arguments against the case of French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954–1962) as an instance of Scenario 1 in which the counterinsurgent uses a high level of civilian targeting. The prospect theory logic of Scenario 1 suggests that unfavourable perceptions of the external threat environment exacerbate the counterinsurgent’s loss aversion and the ensuing inclination to take the risks of killing civilians; yet, a local alliance strategy that refuses to support the domination of some groups over others in the occupied society makes the counterinsurgent more averse to the risks of an extreme level of indiscriminate violence. After presenting the campaign’s background, the chapter highlights French political and military leaders’ perceived overwhelming external threats against French control over Algeria. At the same time, French governments committed themselves to reforms aiming to reduce the political and economic gap between the wealthier European minority and the marginalized Algerian population. After that, the chapter examines the French counterinsurgency campaign and shows that evidence confirms the observable implications and logic of my arguments about Scenario 1. Finally, it considers alternative explanations and concludes that the theoretical framework is still necessary to account for the level of indiscriminate violence in French counterinsurgency in Algeria.