Conclusions

After sketching directions for future research, this chapter sets out the policy implications of this book to protect civilians during expeditionary counterinsurgency. It suggests that under Scenario 2 conditions, when civilian targeting is moderate, the task of saving civilians would hinge upon a policy of non-intervention. Premature interference to protect noncombatants, instead, might endanger civilians’ lives by triggering the counterinsurgents’ perceptions of external threats; that may generate Scenario 1 conditions with a high level of civilian targeting. Once the situation shifts to Scenario 1, saving civilians becomes more complex, as it will be about altering the counterinsurgents’ external threat perceptions. Diplomatic engagement may fail because the task of reassuring the counterinsurgents may clash with other political constraints on the governments trying to protect civilians. If a high level of civilian targeting results from local alliance arrangements, as happens in Scenario 3, the actors concerned with the fate of noncombatants should focus on breaking the alliance between the counterinsurgent and would-be dominant groups. That would be difficult to achieve without coercion when the counterinsurgents’ local alliance strategy is rooted in ideology rather than material interests. Finally, when Scenario 4 occurs, it would become virtually impossible to stop extreme civilian victimization without direct or indirect military intervention.