Constructing the enemy

This chapter examines how and why the invasion of Ukraine became possible, and the ways in which the securitisation of terrorism shaped the Kremlin&s;s path towards full-scale war. It focuses on three interlinked dynamics: first, the expansion of the terrorist threat into a broader amalgam of external dangers, from NATO enlargement to perceived attacks on Russian values and ways of life; second, the use of this amalgamated threat to justify extraordinary measures, including the decision to launch a ground invasion of a neighbouring state; and third, the absence of strong domestic resistance to these measures due to the long-term suppression of civil society and political opposition. In doing so, the chapter situates the invasion within the overarching theme of the book, showing how patterns of securitisation established during the Chechen Wars laid the groundwork for Moscow&s;s later ability to mobilise emergency politics of unprecedented scale. The analysis proceeds by tracing the development of terrorism securitisation into a wider epistemic framework that legitimises regime narratives, before considering how these narratives have become embedded in Russia&s;s political fabric.