David Hume and T. H. Huxley on language, thought, and animal minds

This chapter examines a critique of Hume by T. H. Huxley, focusing on Hume’s account of general ideas. By Huxley’s lights, Hume is committed to an inconsistent triad: (1) general ideas require language; (2) pre-linguistic infants and non-linguistic animals draw causal inferences; and (3) causal inference requires general ideas. Huxley sees this inconsistency as a local manifestation of a more global tension within Hume’s philosophy, involving Hume’s empiricism (which pushes him to accept proposition 1) and his naturalism (which pushes him to accept propositions 2 and 3). The chapter surveys the reasons to think that Hume is committed to each of the three propositions and considers two ways to solve the problem: Hume’s preferred solution, which involves rejecting (3), and Huxley’s, which involves rejecting (1). Cottrell argues that both solutions have costs and that, in order to accept Huxley’s solution, Hume must weaken his empiricism. This argument, Cottrell conjectures, may lie behind Hume’s acceptance of proposition (1).