The pleasures of truth and intrinsic motivation in Hume's account of epistemic curiosity

In contemporary discussions within the psychology and philosophy of emotions, curiosity is generally conceived as an intrinsic motivation for acquiring knowledge. Hume’s characterization of curiosity as the “love of truth” appears to align with this view. However, this chapter argues that this is not the case. For Hume, the objects of epistemic curiosity attract and motivate us due to a combination of factors that go well beyond their mere epistemic value. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section highlights three remarks Hume makes about the role of truth in the expression of epistemic curiosity. The second section examines the conditions that, according to Hume, must be met for truth to serve as a genuine source of satisfaction and motivation. Finally, the essay concludes by demonstrating the relevance of this analysis through a discussion of the causal relationship between despair and epistemic curiosity in Hume’s philosophy.