Popper's Naturalistic Fallibilism

My aim in this chapter is to present the Popperian philosophical legacy as a type of fallibilism that is fruitful in limiting the damage that can arise from human cognitive vulnerability. This fallibilism is fruitful because it supports trust in human cognitive success in the realms of both scientific and non-scientific knowledge. To this end, I shall outline what I mean by cognitive (or epistemic) vulnerability. In so doing, I approach the notion of cognitive vulnerability first and foremost as an epistemological (rather than psychological) category. This category is part of a more general (existential) notion of vulnerability, one that is inherent in the human condition. I then characterise fallibilism and situate the Popperian fallibilism as an optimistic and naturalistic version thereof. I shall also explicate connections between cognitive vulnerability, Popperian optimistic fallibilism, and Popper’s epistemological Darwinism. I shall argue that Popper promotes a kind of epistemological naturalism. Without denying contributions from the sciences, this naturalism philosophically reflects on human knowledge. It also presents such knowledge as an acquisition resulting from biological and cultural evolution. I end by mentioning some of the shortcomings of the Popperian proposal.