China, Japan, and Northeast Asia

This chapter examines how political actors in China and Japan engaged in state identity politics in relation to Northeast Asia, focusing on the China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJKFTA). In China, Xi Jinping assumed power with a high degree of consolidation, aided by factional rivalry and political and economic crises. He replaced Hu Jintao’s peaceful riser identity with a G2 great power identity, positioning China as an equal peer to the US and a co-shaper of the international order. This shift toward international politics of assertion reduced interest in status quo initiatives such as the CJKFTA and prioritised identity-affirming projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In Japan, there was also a high level of domestic consensus on Northeast Asia. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)’s conciliatory, Asia-oriented approach failed due to external resistance and domestic constraints, fostering agreement on the need for change and giving the Abe-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) considerable agency space. Abe and his allies pursued an international politics of assertion , projecting Japan’s identity as a confident, unapologetic, and self-assured beautiful nation . This identity shift moved policy away from the CJKFTA, long associated with the DPJ, toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the core of Japan’s new Indo-Pacific strategy. In this case, both Chinese and Japanese actors pursued international politics of assertion , fuelling an intensely competitive dynamic that generated significant turbulence in bilateral relations and frequently overshadowed opportunities for cooperation.