The Particular Aptitude of Virtue for Video Game Ethics
Abstract
This chapter examines the challenge posed by the ludic amoralist, who denies the moral assessability of video game actions on the ground that they are merely pretense actions. It argues that utilitarian and deontological ethics systematically struggle to account for the moral status of virtual play. Virtue ethics, by contrast, provides a more promising framework. After distinguishing external and internal aretaic approaches, the chapter defends the internal position of aretaic expressivism: virtual gaming actions are wrong insofar as they express vice. This framework offers a virtue-ethical response to the ludic amoralist.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Digital Games and Media
Ethics
Aesthetics
and Art
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Routledge eBooks
- Pages
- 15–32
- Publication date
- 10 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter