Would the Virtuous Gamer Virtually Murder an NPC?

This chapter argues that a virtuous gamer would be able to virtually murder a non-playable character (NPC) and remain virtuous. In defense of this claim, it is argued that virtue consequentialism – which holds that engaging repeatedly in video game violence risks contaminating one’s virtue – is empirically unsubstantiated. Moreover, given that Aristotelian virtue ethics is not the only approach to virtue, it is further argued that gamespace, with its altered contingencies, affords the gamer the opportunity to explore and even embrace actions considered virtuous by other approaches (e.g., Nietzschean). By restricting different virtues to their corresponding spaces, through a process of compartmentalization, the gamer is potentially able to enjoy video game violence, such as murder, without risk of contamination and therefore harm. Bartel’s challenge to compartmentalization is also addressed by distinguishing between different types of fantasy: idle and surrogate. It is argued that the former fantasy is compatible with an Aristotelian approach to virtue, even when enacting murder, whereas the latter is not. In the case of Nietzschean virtue, however, both might be possible when playing violent video games.