Social Functions

Read full text
Authors: Frank Hindriks
Cited by: 0

Abstract

Social functionalism comes in two kinds, evolutionary and non-evolutionary. However, each faces a significant problem. The most prominent kind of non-evolutionary functionalism, rational choice functionalism, relies on value judgments to distinguish between institutions with and without a function, which makes it inadequate as an explanatory theory (the axiological problem). Evolutionary functionalism identifies culture with traits of individuals, behavioral or informational. Because of this, it fails to capture the complexity of institutions, in particular the interdependences and relationships between their participants (the complexity problem). Solving these problems requires a richer theory of institutions, one that involves not only equilibria but also rules. First, this chapter argues that rules provide for a non-arbitrary way to distinguish institutions that have a function from those that do not. Second, they help to do justice to their complexity: they capture their symbolic and normative features and account for social roles and material resources. Thus, it is possible to develop two adequate conceptions of social functions, which account for both the proliferation and the persistence of institutions.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Economic Theory and Institutions Critical Realism in Sociology Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice

Publication details

Journal / source
Routledge eBooks
Pages
71–95
Publication date
27 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter