Social Functions
Abstract
Social functionalism comes in two kinds, evolutionary and non-evolutionary. However, each faces a significant problem. The most prominent kind of non-evolutionary functionalism, rational choice functionalism, relies on value judgments to distinguish between institutions with and without a function, which makes it inadequate as an explanatory theory (the axiological problem). Evolutionary functionalism identifies culture with traits of individuals, behavioral or informational. Because of this, it fails to capture the complexity of institutions, in particular the interdependences and relationships between their participants (the complexity problem). Solving these problems requires a richer theory of institutions, one that involves not only equilibria but also rules. First, this chapter argues that rules provide for a non-arbitrary way to distinguish institutions that have a function from those that do not. Second, they help to do justice to their complexity: they capture their symbolic and normative features and account for social roles and material resources. Thus, it is possible to develop two adequate conceptions of social functions, which account for both the proliferation and the persistence of institutions.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Economic Theory and Institutions
Critical Realism in Sociology
Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Routledge eBooks
- Pages
- 71–95
- Publication date
- 27 January 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter