The confidence relations between the legislature and the executive in parliamentary democracies

The parliament’s role during government formation, survival, and termination is expressed through the votes of investiture, confidence, and no confidence, which collectively shape the confidence relations between legislatures and executives. Despite their centrality in parliamentary democracies, the conceptualisation of these relations, the institutional rules governing each vote, and the interplay between them remain underexplored. This chapter develops a novel framework for analysing the confidence relations and argues that their design helps shape the comprehensive balance of power between legislatures and executives. Using original data from 22 parliamentary democracies, the chapter codes the institutional rules of the confidence votes and examines their interconnectedness. The findings reveal systematic patterns of institutional variation, particularly in the majority requirements, suggesting that confidence votes can be strategically designed to balance executive stability and responsibility. Moreover, the broader procedural rules governing these votes frequently diverge, highlighting the complexity of the confidence relations.