Elite loyalty, legislative productivity, or constituency service

A key feature of majoritarian systems is the abundance of safe seats, heightening the importance of intra-party candidate selection processes. In such systems, actual competition for seats occurs within parties instead of between them. Yet, despite the widespread adoption of party primaries in Africa, little is known about the exact aspects of MPs’ work that party elites reward. This chapter, drawing on interviews with Ghanaian party delegates, argues that elites prefer not only candidates who deliver patronage as the existing literature widely portrays, but also those who demonstrate parliamentary productivity and deliver constituency service. However, their preferences vary based on electoral competitiveness and party status. In government, elites favour MPs focused on handouts and constituency service, while opposition elites prioritise legislative effectiveness. Additionally, safe-seat elites reward parliamentary work, whereas contested-seat elites emphasise constituency engagement. This challenges the view that African party politics is solely patronage driven, highlighting nuanced trade-offs in candidate selection.