The Position of Ainslie's Theory in the Constellation of Rational Choice Theory and Action Theory

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Authors: Yujian Zheng
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Abstract

This chapter is an exposition of the location of Ainslie's approach against a referential spectrum of approaches to the dynamic preference-reversal problem. It divides into two parts. The first part focuses on the relation of Ainslie's personal-rule approach to two other positions: one is Jon Elster's precommitment strategy, exemplified by Ulysses’ tying himself beforehand; the other is McClennen's resolute choice, featuring holistic rational deliberation. In addition, a methodological comparison between Gauthier's project of rational morality and Ainslie's rule-following project contributes to a special view about rational bargaining among similar agents, i.e., it should establish compliance-securing rules in contexts of both interpersonal and intrapersonal interactions. In the second part of the chapter, I present an exposition of the explanatory power of Ainslie's model in solving the problem of how akrasia is possible. For a comparative backdrop, I present Davidson's attempt to explain akrasia by appealing to a partitioned model of mind, and explain why it is not successful. In that connection, I also briefly review some of the related ideas of a few other philosophers, such as David Pears, John Heil and Alfred Mele.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Free Will and Agency

Publication details

Journal / source
Routledge eBooks
Pages
17–33
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter