Essential Issues for an Ainsliean Model

View at publisher Summarise with VIRAT
Authors: Yujian Zheng
Cited by: 0

Summary

No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.

Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.

Abstract

Four essential issues are covered in the first part of the chapter: (1) While we grant Ainslie's analogy between intrapersonal bargaining and interpersonal repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, we should not ignore important disanalogies; (2) Certain minimum assumptions seem to be required for the viability of an Ainsliean model and have implications for the unity of a person, comparable with the “public goods” assumption for the unity of a society; (3) There seems a distinctive normative dimension to the construction of “long-range interests;” (4) A metaphysical structure of intrapersonal bargaining involves the distinction of a “supervising self” vs. a “momentary self” instead of the familiar distinction between “present self” vs. “past self” or “future self.” The second part of the chapter concerns the necessity and the viability of personal rules under choice-structural constraints. It builds around an objection to Ainslie's approach and various possible responses. That leads to an argument based on the consideration of “backward induction” and its inapplicability to indefinite-length sequences of choice. The conclusion is that the bundling idea embedded in personal rules is the only solution to the intrapersonal “free rider” problem for indefinite-length games. The ultimate credibility of the bundling idea lies in joining a normative belief to the descriptive constraints.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications

Publication details

Journal / source
Routledge eBooks
Pages
34–49
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter