Bratman's Challenge to Ainslie's Model and a Response

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Authors: Yujian Zheng
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Abstract

This chapter examines Bratman's challenge to Ainslie's theory and some related issues the challenge seems to involve. Bratman's paper, “Planning and Temptation,” focuses on some of the basic features of Ainslie's theory and raises powerful objections to it. Moreover, it draws on several important notions that prove helpful in understanding the Ainsliean model; they include “present-directed vs. future-directed intention,” “conservative strategy” (of standard expected-utility theory), “reflective vs. non-reflective reconsideration,” “personal policy vs. personal rule,” different senses of “causal explanation” of choice, the “one boxer” model of reasoning, etc. My argument is that the central part of Bratman's critique fails because he does not sufficiently understand the distinctive way in which the Ainsliean approach, under some plausible interpretation, is both descriptive and normative. In the last part of the chapter, I engage one aspect of Bratman's theory of intentional stability with the help of what can be called “the Ainsliean analog of the toxin puzzle,” and hope to shed some light on the dispute between Bratman and McClennen concerning the rational solution of the toxin puzzle.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Behavioral Health and Interventions

Publication details

Journal / source
Routledge eBooks
Pages
50–74
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter