Singular Propositions
Abstract
In Chapter 4 , Davidson takes up the nature of singular propositions. He begins by considering a number of accounts of singular propositionhood that one finds in the proposition literature over the last 40 years. He criticizes each of them before offering his own account. On Davidson&s;s account, a proposition is singular if its truth conditions are determined by an element in the structured proposition exemplifying a property or standing in a relation elsewhere in the structured proposition. He concludes the chapter by examining an argument from Frege that propositions can&s;t have concrete objects as constituents.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Syntax
Semantics
Linguistic Variation
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Routledge eBooks
- Pages
- 82–97
- Publication date
- 12 January 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter