No Promises in the Rose Garden

This chapter illustrates the rarity of policy exceptions, strategic value in building alliances, constraints from domestic politics, and insights into how U.S. foreign policy works with offsets in high-stakes arms deals. This cross-sectional case study examines U.S. Government involvement in Lockheed Martin’s 1997–2000 competition for F-16 sales to the United Arab Emirates, working against France’s Rafale, amid regional tensions with Iran during the post-Gulf War period. The chapter’s title references Vice President Gore prematurely announcing success in 1998 from the White House Rose Garden for a deal that was not yet locked in, highlighting political challenges for government involvement. Evidence supports a three-step process with Emirati offset demands and security needs; Lockheed Martin lobbying for American political alignment; and executive encouragement, including Department of Commerce praise for offsets aligning with White House policy. Putnam’s two-level game unfolded as U.S. officials engaged UAE counterparts on behalf of domestic stakeholders to boost American arms exports. However, Emirati “pre-offset” project requirements minimized U.S. Government intervention. Relative gains concerns – arms market rivalry and UAE burden sharing – drove action. Although offsets served as an important tool of foreign policy, that role emerged even more prominently in later engagement with Poland and India.