Beyond the Cases

This chapter synthesizes evidence confirming U.S. Government encouragement for offsets despite “hands off” prohibitions, points to avenues for further research, and explains how both offsets and encouragement continue to operate. Encouragement grows through a three-step process with delivery through Putnam’s two-level game. Claims show that two variables for relative gains concerns – arms trade competitions and burden sharing with weak security partners – amplify causation; domestic alignment enables executive decisions; and games structure negotiations to override taboos when industry interests converge with national security. Evidence emerged in policy subtlety with the United Arab Emirates, bold loans to Poland, and diplomatic-congressional engagement with India. Trends beyond cases include Trump-era global shaping and exceptions where Congress advocated to the executive branch and lobbied international leaders on behalf of both industry and the White House. Theory proves transportable to other U.S. scenarios involving presidential exceptions for national security and to other countries where they face domestic controversy about offsets. This book challenges misperceptions, showing government encouragement despite political risks because there is no ironclad ban. Recommendations urge policy leaders to leverage this flexibility for alliances, industrial base strength, and diplomacy. Ultimately, understanding encouragement in the presidential exception enhances foreign policy options.