Epistemic Rights

Recent developments in the literature on epistemic injustice have highlighted the critical role of epistemic rights in protecting the fundamental interests of individuals within political societies. However, there has been comparatively less focus on exploring the value of epistemic rights beyond their protective functions, and even less attention has been given to alternative theoretical justifications for these rights. This chapter seeks to fill that gap by drawing on Confucian intellectual resources. Specifically, it argues that the Confucian ideal of harmony promotes a social environment characterized by diverse and multiple epistemic perspectives – without polarization – and that epistemic rights serve as the foundation for this environment by providing opportunities for individuals to learn how to accommodate differing epistemic standpoints. Furthermore, unlike prevailing accounts that emphasize the protective role of epistemic rights against the harms of epistemic injustice, the Confucian understanding of reflective capacities and moral knowledge offers a developmental approach that highlights the importance of epistemic rights in fostering individual virtue development. Finally, from a Confucian perspective, the collective political value of epistemic rights is important, as they can complement certain institutional proposals made by Confucian political theorists to address the problem of epistemic detachment among leaders. Ultimately, this chapter aims to shed light on a Confucian perspective of epistemic rights that emphasizes their relational, developmental, and collective political values.