Peripheral Interests

This chapter explains why the Sudanese Civil War attracted only limited engagement from major powers compared to Syria, Libya, and Yemen. It argues that Washington and Moscow treated Sudan as a peripheral case: the United States relied on diplomacy, sanctions, and humanitarian support while avoiding costly military commitments; Russia pursued opportunistic access to gold, political leverage through ties with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, and periodic signaling over a potential Red Sea presence. The analysis examines Sudan’s internal drivers, military rivalries following the failed transition, fragmented authority, and regional interventions by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others, and shows how these factors reduced the payoff to sustained great-power involvement. Competing explanations, including counterterrorism, great-power rivalry, and ideological alignments, are assessed against observable behavior in arms flows, mediation, and voting in international forums. The evidence indicates that low perceived stakes and unreliable partners produced minimal, indirect engagement. Sudan, therefore, clarifies the boundary conditions of great-power intervention: where strategic returns are modest and regional actors dominate, major powers prioritize risk-averse diplomacy and selective influence over direct intervention.