Theories of social justice

Theories of social justice are the focus of the second chapter, which begins with the development of a taxonomy. Using the taxonomic criteria generated, the relevant theories of social justice were sorted and discussed, particularly with regard to the question of whether they were suitable for supporting the thesis of just happiness. In this sense, a theory of social justice would be suitable if it developed a type of justice that was compatible with formal justice. In the course of the critical discussion, it became apparent that none of the relevant theories of social justice meets this requirement profile or can be reconciled with the idea of formal justice. This result applies to all variants of social justice, including those that act as a complement, corrective, or compensation for supposedly inadequate formal justice. It also applies when one of the variants only supposedly criticises social injustice, but in reality criticises formal injustice. There are many reasons for the failure of theories of social justice in the above sense. Within the framework of Rawls’ approach, it should have been possible to prove that only the redistribution of the spontaneous distribution of material happiness, but not its preservation, is rationally justifiable. If successful, this could have meant the compatibility of formal and social justice. However, neither Rawls nor his followers succeeded in proving this. Current theories of social justice either completely abandon such efforts at compatibility or resort to additional assumptions which, as we have seen, also do not stand up to criticism. They base their position in particular on what proves to be the watershed between proponents and critics of social justice, namely the thesis that all discrimination requires justification. Critics of redistribution can counter this by arguing that it is not discrimination per se that requires justification, but rather the claim to make discrimination generally binding.