Aristotelian ethics in the second century bc

This chapter aims to reevaluate the contribution of Critolaus of Phaselis to the question of the highest human good or telos . Critolaus introduced a form of inclusivism that defines the optimal condition of a human life as a complete aggregate ( symplērōma ) of goods that includes not only virtue but also the somatic and external goods required for the natural flow of a human life. After a survey of passages in Aristotle that could provide a basis for this specific type of inclusivism, the chapter analyzes the testimonia that report or criticize Critolaus’ account of the human telos . It is argued that his approach was shaped by his competition with the Stoics. He uses elements of a Stoic conceptual framework in order to refute the Stoic claim of the self-sufficiency of virtue while retaining the notion of virtue’s superior value. The chapter discusses two different interpretations of the symplērōma formula that can be documented in later ancient sources and explores possible connections with Peripatetic adaptations of the Stoic concept oikeiōsis . The concluding section discusses the merits or demerits of his proposal as a reformulation of the Aristotelian paradigm.