Conclusion

Parsons’ values stressed a form of democratic individualism. He argued not for a form of socialism that stressed material equality but for one that had a set of social democratic values that had much in common with a form of Christianity that encouraged people to demonstrate their spiritual qualities in a secular world. As modernity progressed a process of secularization increasingly removed the role of God in the lives of many people. Parsons’ sociology recognized this development but was still based upon the assumption that people should be treated as if they had a soul and as such all people were equal in the eyes of God and should not be restricted in their opportunities to conduct a life that allowed them to demonstrate their spiritual qualities. Parsons’ approach to explanation building, which as we saw in the first chapter he called ‘analytical realism’, emphasized the principle that the other should be treated as a person not a thing , that we should respect the dignity of the other and respect their autonomy. Michael Weinstein argues that Talcott Parsons’ political thought is derived from his conception of a ‘public morality’ but this has the weakness of ‘excluding many significant value experiences such as creativity and harmony’ (1972: 153). Spates (1983 ) suggests that Parsons’ work on the sociology of values was very influential in the 1950s and early 1960s. Parsons was responsible for raising the status of value analysis in sociology although his theory was in the last analysis flawed, argues Spates, in that it lacked empirical support, imposed predetermined categories on reality and was formulated with such a high degree of abstraction that it was un researchable. However, as has been argued above, Weinstein and Spates can only make such claims if we ignore what Parsons has to say about the unit act and the ability of the individual human agent to create binding obligations upon themselves.