Natural Equality and Common Good

Apart from natural law, no concept is more important to Locke’s argument in the Two Treatises than the state of nature. The significance of the concept, however, does not ensure that the meaning Locke attaches to it can be easily understood. Indeed, it could be argued that it is precisely the ambiguity of the state of nature, its several meanings in the context of Locke’s argument, that accounts for its importance to his political theory. I believe the state of nature embodies amoral, historical and political meaning. Of course, this is an analytical distinction I have made for purposes of exposition, and while I think it is defensible in terms of Locke’s own methodological approach to politics it must be emphasized that these meanings frequently overlap and intersect throughout the course of his argument in the Second Treatise. It is also useful to recall the point made in Chapter 2 that, for Locke, a political theory is composed of two distinguishable parts, one rooted in moral principles and the other in prudential judgements based upon experience. In the discussion that follows, therefore, I propose to view Locke’s usage of the state of nature within this definitional framework. In addition to the moral and historical aspects of the state of nature which incorporates this dualistic conception of political theory, however, there is a specific political meaning that Locke wishes to convey through his employment of that term which must also be taken into account.