Can There be Special Rights for Some Citizens?

Many argue that, given the all-subjected principle, non-temporary immigrants should have access to citizenship, challenging differences in rights between denizens and citizens. This article reassesses this conclusion by examining the case for a pathway to citizenship for denizens and asking whether former denizens, now citizens, can be denied some rights existing citizens have. It reconstructs Hart’s distinction between general and special rights, demonstrating with reference to Kant how the special right to political citizenship stems from general rights. This elucidates why denizens are entitled to a path to political citizenship. The article further explores how the exercise of citizenship can lead to additional special rights, scrutinizing whether these must also accrue to new citizens. It discusses conditions under which these further special rights might justify a distinction between citizens. The conclusion argues that reserving certain rights for some citizens is interesting for rethinking democratic theory in light of increasing mobility, less for justifying different rights for citizens and former denizens.