American Fleet Ballistic Missiles

By the late 1950s, prominent strategic and military figures in both the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union were advocating the development of the capability for a preemptive nuclear attack. To prepare for preemption, each side built up large counter-force capabilities with an instant readiness to fire. Preemption demanded both speed and surprise . US bombers, the most accurate arm of the American counter-force strategy in the early days of the nuclear age, would require an hour or two to hit the target, assuming they were not detected and neutralised by the Soviet air defence. Land- based ballistic missiles proved to be a faster option. However, the missile technology of the day was still plagued by issues of inaccuracy. The navy variant of the ballistic missile offered the biggest scope for a successful sneak attack, but it was the most inaccurate option of all. Because of its inaccuracy and the burgeoning cost of its development, the US Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programme, therefore, saw little enthusiasm both inside and outside the United States Navy. Ironically, it was the Sputnik launch of 1957 that finally pushed the FBM programme to the highest national priority and accelerated its development. 1