Hiding in Plain Sight

The development of Russia’s sea-based nuclear strategy differs significantly from that of the United States. An obvious illustration of this distinction may be seen in the development of the erstwhile Soviet Union’s fleet of SSBNs. The Soviet Army had demonstrated a logical progression in both weapon design and deployment towards a defined goal: specifically, the creation of a safe strategic reserve, withheld both physically and operationally, to offer intra-war deterrence. The initial plan for the Soviet nuclear triad included the use of SSBNs close to American territorial seas. However, the Soviets quickly realised by the early 1970s, that the NATO Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities had surpassed their submarines’ capacity to avoid detection. As a result, the ‘anti-SSBN’ strategy was reevaluated, and the Soviet Navy’s primary priority shifted from being a blue water fleet to being focussed on safeguarding its boomers by using a sort of layered defence.