Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank Regulation

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Authors: Mark J. Flannery
Cited by: 51

Abstract

Many bank managers and owners have long complained that they are over-regulated by a plethora of government agencies. The thrust of their complaint is that they could do a better job - i.e. become more profitable or increase their bank’s market value - if left unencumbered by regulations limiting portfolio choice, capital adequacy, holding company formations, deposit rates, and so forth. They are doubtless correct. Yet banking in the US possesses institutional characteristics that require at least some of the regulations currently in place. In particular, Federal deposit insurance gives insured bankers an artificial incentive to undertake more risk than they would in an unregulated and uninsured free market. Bankers insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can benefit privately by undertaking risks that the society as a whole consider excessive.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Banking stability regulation efficiency

Publication details

Journal / source
UK Banking Supervision
Publisher
Routledge
Pages
257–269
Publication date
26 May 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter