From Hybrid Warfare to Conventional Force

Many discussions of Russia&s;s international strategy since 2014 have centered on the concept of “hybrid warfare.” This term conveys the idea that Russia had optimized its use of various policy instruments—be they military, media, or energy—to weaken target societies and governments in a subtle enough manner that Russia can gain influence while minimizing the consequences that come with more forceful and less deniable forms of coercion. Russia&s;s decision to escalate militarily against Ukraine in 2022 and its strategic failures in this conflict occasion a rethink about common ideas regarding hybrid warfare and, relatedly, gray zone conflict. The overarching argument of this chapter is that neither Russia nor North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members are at present going about hybrid warfare, gray zone conflict, or, for that matter, proxy war. Russia&s;s decision to escalate militarily in 2022 resulted from a frustration that its more covert and deniable tactics—typically associated with hybrid warfare or gray zone conflict—failed to yield the desired strategic result. Since NATO members&s; responses to Russian aggression are largely overt, undeniable, and consistent with international law through their use of sanctions and military assistance, NATO members are engaging in coercion but not in gray zone conflict.