Judicial Rules for Admissibility of Forensic Science Evidence

View at publisher
Authors: Donald E. Shelton
Cited by: 0

Abstract

The rule announced in Frye v. United States , 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923) became the standard for judges to determine the admissibility of forensic science evidence. The court said that the science behind the testimony “must have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” While the general acceptance test relies on the opinion of scientists, it has been criticized because it ignores the speed at which science develops and because it delegates a judicial responsibility to non-lawyers. The general acceptance test lasted in most courts until 1993, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 509 U.S. 579 ( 1993 ) The Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded any ruling in Frye and announced a nonexclusive set of five criteria federal judges must use to decide the admissibility of forensic science evidence: whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; the known or potential rate of error; the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal; and general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. The subsequent case of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137 ( 1999 ), held that the Daubert rule applies to all experts. In our system of federalism, States may apply their own rules of evidence, and while most States have adopted the Daubert standards, some States still use Frye or some variant of it.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Legal processes and jurisprudence Criminal Law and Evidence Jury Decision Making Processes

Publication details

Journal / source
CRC Press eBooks
Pages
9–25
Publication date
29 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter