Content Accounts of Shared Intention

This chapter explains the content problem for we-intentions, that is, the intentions of those participating in joint intentional action directed toward their doing something together. It is not sufficient to share an intention that members of a group all intend that they do something together because, for example, they may intend to trick one another into doing it, not realizing that is what the others intend as well. Responses are divided into those that urge that the content must include sui generis concepts relating to joint intentional action in the content and those that offer accounts of the content that draw only on concepts at play in our understanding of individual agency. A set of adequacy conditions is articulated and then the accounts of Raimo Tuomela (irreducible content) and of Michael Bratman (reducible content), and Kirk Ludwig (reducible content) are reviewed. Some objections to accounts that make the groups doing something part of the content of we-intentions are reviewed and answers provided in the frameworks of Bratman and Ludwig. Some difficulties are raised for Bratman's account, and it is argued that Ludwig's account is not subject to the same difficulties. The chapter concludes that substantial progress has been made on understanding the conditions under which people share an intention and act together intentionally in terms that draw only on concepts deployed in our understanding of individual agency.