What do information choices tell us about selfishness? Preference construction and preference revelation

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Authors: Danae Arroyos-Calvera, Rebecca Louise McDonald, Daniel Read, Bruce Rigal
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Abstract

People who choose to remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions on others act more selfishly. We distinguish between two explanations for this: preference construction, according to which information received or shared determines our preferences, and preference revelation, according to which our selfishness determines the information we want to receive or share. We distinguished between these explanations by means of a modified dictator game with three treatments differing in who knows the endowment (the “information state”) and whether this knowledge is determined through a choice made by the dictator or through random assignment. Regardless of what information state dictators were assigned to, those who chose to hide information from themselves and/or recipients were more selfish than those who chose for everyone to be informed. This supports the preference revelation hypothesis. We conclude with a simple model that interprets the decisions between selfishness and disclosure decisions.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Game Theory and Voting Systems

Publication details

Journal / source
Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks
Pages
138–157
Publication date
19 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter