A Framework for designing High-Order Side-Channel Protected Hardware Implementations of ML-KEM

Read full text
Authors: Eros Camacho-Ruiz, Pablo Navarro-Torrero, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya
Cited by: 3

Abstract

ML-KEM (formerly Kyber) has recently been adopted as FIPS 203 in the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. While existing hardware implementations primarily optimize for performance, they often lack protections against side-channel attacks. We introduce HOPE-MLKEM, a framework that includes the first configurable, open, and full-hardware implementation of ML-KEM with integrated high-order protection against timing and power side-channel attacks. Our modular architecture supports all security levels and operations, incorporating optimized building blocks for polynomial arithmetic, modular multiplication, and programmable control logic. At the same time, this methodology enables the seamless integration of masking countermeasures up to high orders. We evaluated HOPE-MLKEM on FPGA and ASIC platforms, achieving competitive results compared to state-ofthe- art unprotected designs while providing resistance against high-order side-channel attacks. Beyond its technical contributions, HOPE-MLKEM is released as an opensource framework to foster community-driven exploration of design choices, leakage evaluation, and hardware optimizations.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cryptographic Implementations and Security Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic Security and Verification in Computing

Publication details

Journal / source
IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Publisher
Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
Volume
2026
Issue
2
Pages
272–295
Publication date
23 April 2026
Language
EN