Joint Effects and ESG Rating Disagreement: The Interactive Effects of Media and Analysts Based on China's A-Share Market

ESG rating disagreement increases information uncertainty for investors and weakens the usefulness of ESG scores in capital markets.Although prior studies document substantial divergence among ESG ratings, relatively limited attention has been paid to the role of external information intermediaries, particularly in emerging markets.This study examines how media attention and analyst coverage jointly affect ESG rating disagreement for Chinese A-share listed firms.Based on information-intermediary and information-asymmetry theories, the study argues that media and financial analysts act as complementary monitoring mechanisms.Media attention enhances transparency by disseminating ESG-related information, while analyst coverage improves interpretation by providing professional analysis.Together, these channels reduce information gaps faced by ESG rating agencies and improve rating consistency.Using an unbalanced panel comprising 15,955 firm-year observations during the period 2015-2023, the study measures ESG rating disagreement across major rating agencies.Media attention is proxied by firm-level media coverage, while analyst coverage is operationalized as the number of analysts covering the firm.OLS models absorbing firm and year fixed effects are estimated, along with robustness checks including alternative measures, lagged variables, as well as propensity score matching.The analysis shows that the interaction between media attention and analyst coverage significantly reduces disagreement in ESG ratings.A one-standard-deviation rise in joint monitoring is associated with a 6.3% lower level of rating disagreement.This effect is stronger for private firms, non-polluting industries, and firms with high media visibility.Taken together, the findings underscore the pivotal role of coordinated external monitoring in improving ESG information quality and rating reliability in emerging markets.