Economic Analysis of Politics: Contributions and Limits of Public Choice Theory

Public Choice Theory (PCT) has profoundly reshaped the positive analysis of politics by applying microeconomic reasoning to political institutions, incentives, and collective decision-making. This article offers a comprehensive and integrative review of the theoretical foundations, empirical applications, and conceptual limitations of PCT, with particular emphasis on the transition from the notion of a benevolent state to a view of politics as a system of exchange constrained by institutional rules (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Mueller, 2003). Using a narrative review with systematic elements, the study synthesizes classical contributions -such as the median voter theorem, political budget cycles, regulatory capture, and the logic of collective action- with contemporary extensions addressing constitutional design, populism, global public goods, and behavioural critiques (Sen, 1999; Kahneman, 2011). The literature is organised into four analytical axes: foundational models, institutional mechanisms, theoretical extensions, and empirical applications.