Principal–Agent Theory and Results-Based Climate Finance: A Review of Lessons from the World Bank's Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes

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Authors: Fikayo Akeredolu
Cited by: 0
References: 24

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Abstract

This review examines how principal–agent theory explains the performance of results-based climate finance, drawing on the World Bank's Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes as its primary empirical case. PA theory identifies four structural risks in climate finance: adverse selection when agents overstate readiness; moral hazard when grant-funded activities lack performance discipline; multitask trade-offs when carbon metrics crowd out social and environmental co-benefits; and contract incompleteness when verification systems cannot anticipate all contingencies. Evidence from ISFL's decade-long operation confirms that results-based design — through Emission Reductions Purchase Agreements, jurisdictional monitoring, buffer mechanisms, and benefitsharing plans — meaningfully addresses some of these problems. Yet readiness delays, additionality uncertainty, and persistent equity tensions reveal that agency risks are restructured rather than eliminated by results-based payments. Effective climate finance requires complementary institutional reforms that distribute risks equitably, build adaptive governance capacity, and embed incentive design within broader political economy conditions that contracts alone cannot create.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Climate Change Policy and Economics Conservation Biodiversity and Resource Management Sustainable Finance and Green Bonds

Publication details

Journal / source
International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science
Volume
10
Issue
2
Pages
8018–8027
Publication date
21 March 2026
Language
EN