Perturbing Best Responses in Zero-Sum Games
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of perturbations on the best-response-based algorithms approximating Nash equilibria in zero-sum games, namely Double Oracle and Fictitious Play. More precisely, we assume that the oracle computing the best responses perturbs the utilities before selecting the best response. We show that using such an oracle reduces the number of iterations for both algorithms. For some cases, suitable perturbations ensure the expected number of iterations is logarithmic. Although the utility perturbation is computationally demanding as it requires iterating through all pure strategies, we demonstrate that one can efficiently perturb the utilities in games where pure strategies have further inner structure.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Applications
Artificial Intelligence in Games
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Underline Science Inc.
- Publication date
- 7 January 2026
- Language
- EN