Editing Is a Bargaining Game: Balanced Knowledge Editing in Large Language Models

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Authors: Association for Artificial Intelligence 2026, Huilin Chen, Cheng Deng, Fen Fang, Chenghao Xu, Jiexi Yan, Muli Yang
Cited by: 0

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to generating incorrect or outdated information, thereby necessitating efficient and precise mechanisms for knowledge updates. Existing knowledge editing approaches, however, often encounter conflicts between two competing objectives: maintaining existing knowledge (preservation) and incorporating new information (editing). During gradient-based optimization, these conflicting objectives can lead to imbalanced update directions, where one gradient dominates, ultimately resulting in suboptimal learning dynamics. To address this challenge, we propose a balanced knowledge editing framework inspired by Nash bargaining theory. Our method guides the optimization process toward a Pareto stationary point, ensuring an equilibrium solution wherein any deviation from the final state would degrade the overall performance with respect to both objectives. This guarantees optimality in preserving prior knowledge while integrating new information. We empirically validate the effectiveness of our approach across a range of evaluation metrics on standard benchmark datasets. Extensive experiments show that our method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art techniques, achieving a superior balance between knowledge preservation and update accuracy.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Topic Modeling Domain Adaptation and Few-Shot Learning Natural Language Processing Techniques

Publication details

Journal / source
Underline Science Inc.
Publication date
7 January 2026
Language
EN