Correctness, Artificial Intelligence, and the Epistemic Value of Mathematical Proof

PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) 2026 Preprint Open access

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Authors: James Owen Weatherall, Jesse Wolfson
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2602.12463
Cited by: 0

Abstract

We argue that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a mathematical proof to have epistemic value that it be "correct", in the sense of formalizable in a formal proof system. We then present a view on the relationship between mathematics and logic that clarifies the role of formal correctness in mathematics. Finally, we discuss the significance of these arguments for recent discussions about automated theorem provers and applications of AI to mathematics.

Fields of Study & Subjects

History and Theory of Mathematics Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Philosophy and History of Science

Publication details

Journal / source
PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh)
Publication date
12 February 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint