Recovery-Induced Erasure Attack on QKD Systems

Detector dead time is typically treated as a fixed parameter in quantum key distribution (QKD) security analyses. In practice, however, the effective recovery time of single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) depends on the incident count rate. In this work, we demonstrate that this count-rate-dependent recovery nonlinearity constitutes a distinct attack primitive. We experimentally characterize the dead time shift of a free-running SPAD under controlled broadband loading and observe a substantial increase in effective recovery time as the detected rate rises into the high photon count regime. We show that recovery-induced availability reduction can be modeled as an adversarial erasure channel and derive a conservative bound on the signal detection probability under loading. Unlike previously studied detector-control or efficiency mismatch attacks, the proposed mechanism does not rely on deterministic blinding or timing discrimination. Instead, count-rate-dependent recovery asymmetry induces basis-dependent suppression of detection probabilities ($p_\perp