Stable Matching with Choice Correspondences: Beyond Path Independence

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Authors: Varun Bansal -, Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
Cited by: 0
References: 16

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Abstract

We study stable matching with agents' choice correspondences as primitives. For many-to-many markets we introduce Individually Rational Persistence (IRP), which admits status-quo persistence, and show that substitutability (SUB) and IRP guarantee a stable matching; the constructive proof yields a symmetric matching algorithm with no proposing side and long-term contracts. For one-to-one markets we introduce replacement-based stability and show that SUB together with binary acyclicity (BA) guarantees existence. Combining the two, in the many-to-one setting, where SUB and irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) guarantee stability, we show that SUB with IRP on firms and BA on workers guarantees existence. We show that, in the presence of SUB, IRC is not necessary for existence in any of the three models, so stable matchings exist outside the domain of path independence.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models Optimization and Search Problems

Publication details

Journal / source
arXiv (Cornell University)
Publication date
24 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint