SNARE: A TRAP for Rational Players to Solve Byzantine Consensus in the 5f+1 Model

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Authors: Alejandro Ranchal Pedrosa, Benjamin Marsh
Cited by: 0
References: 20

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Abstract

The TRAP protocol solves rational agreement by combining accountable consensus with a one-shot BFTCR finalization phase. We present SNARE (Scalable Nash Agreement via Reward and Exclusion), the adaptation of TRAP to $n=5f{+}1$, and prove $ε$-$(k,t)$-robustness for rational agreement tolerating coalitions up to ${\approx}73\%$ with deposits under $0.5\%$ of the gain. A central finding is that appending a single all-to-all broadcast round with the $4f{+}1$ threshold after predecisions yields $ε$-$(k,t)$-robustness for coalitions up to $3f$ (${\approx}60\%$) without any deposit: we need not model or know the utility function of deviating players, only that they participate in the protocol. These players can be \emph{deceitful} (arbitrary unknown utility), not just rational, and the finalization structure prevents disagreement regardless of their motivation. This observation is protocol-agnostic, applies to any $5f{+}1$ protocol at the cost of one message delay that runs concurrently with the next view, and does not require commit-reveal mechanisms. Above $60\%$, the full baiting mechanism with deposits under $0.5\%$ extends tolerance to ${\approx}73\%$. A second finding is that valid-candidacy, the property preventing reward front-running, holds unconditionally regardless of the quorum threshold, removing both the $n>2(k{+}t)$ and $n>\frac{3}{2}k{+}3t$ constraints from the original TRAP. This retroactively extends the $3f{+}1$ bound from $C

Fields of Study & Subjects

Distributed systems and fault tolerance Blockchain Technology Applications and Security Cryptography and Data Security

Publication details

Journal / source
arXiv (Cornell University)
Publication date
24 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint