The Ethics of Scepticism: Epistemic Blame and the Social Dynamics of Epistemic Risk-Taking

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Authors: Jesús Navarro Reyes
Cited by: 0
References: 36

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Abstract

This paper levels a charge of free riding against the figure of the radical sceptic. Due to their persistent resistance to attributing knowledge to themselves and others, the radical sceptic limits their contributions to the social context to “mere estimates” or “mere opinions.” Through these “careful beliefs,” they aim to avoid all epistemic risk—something they can achieve only at the cost of falling short of the expectations we legitimately have of our cognitive partners, namely, that they carefully offer us their “full beliefs” as critical cognitive attitudes that reflect a personal stance on the facts. The implication of these radical sceptical attitudes in the social context is an imbalance in the attribution of epistemic credit, which justifies, on our part, an attitude of epistemic blame.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Publication details

Journal / source
Principia an international journal of epistemology
Volume
30
Issue
2
Pages
307–329
Publication date
12 August 2026
Language
EN