A Tilly Comparative Study on State-building in South Vietnam and Afghanistan

The 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was often compared to the 1975 fall of South Vietnam as two strategic failures by the United States in attempting to establish a Western-friendly, democratic government in their regions. While superficial similarities could be observed between the two cases, this research provides a further comparative analysis of state-building efforts in South Vietnam and Afghanistan to uncover critical lessons in regime-sustaining and the politics of American intervention. The article uses Charles Tilly’s "war makes state" concept to examine war-making, state-making, protection, and extraction as core elements of state-building. The research utilizes comparative historical analysis to highlight the need for a deeper understanding of local politics, corruption, and governance issues. Additionally, differences between the case studies of Afghanistan and South Vietnam are also discussed, ranging from geopolitical and international support to the nature of the opponents and the level of state institutionalism. By examining these factors, this article offers insights into the recurring obstacles in U.S. state-building efforts and their implications for future foreign interventions.