The Right to be We: The Case of Associations

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Authors: Michael Schmitz
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Abstract

Why freedom of association? Why a right to be a We, and why a right to be the particular kind of We, the particular kind of group, that is an association? For surely the right to freely associate is not the only kind of right to form and be a We that we commonly recognise. For example, we also recognise rights to marry or partner and to form a family, and even though these are in some sense rights to associate with others, this is not what is usually meant when we talk about the right to freedom of association. We would rather think of these as fundamental human rights. On the other end of the spectrum, we also recognise a right for people or peoples to form states – though how this is to be understood is a matter of some controversy. This right is also generally thought to be a fundamental human right or political right and in some sense it concerns the association of people. But again, this is not what people ordinarily think of when thinking of freedom of association.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Legal Rights and Human Rights Political Philosophy and Ethics Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies

Publication details

Journal / source
Hart Publishing eBooks
Pages
229–244
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter