The impact of consumer preference on traffic configuration and channel coordination of a live-streaming enterprise

With the continuous enrichment of live-streaming content, consumers gradually exhibit different preferences for live streaming shopping. This study constructs a centralized and decentralized supply chain game model between a supplier and a live-streaming enterprise (LSE), considering shopping-preferred consumers and content-preferred consumers. We find that in centralized and decentralized settings, the total profit for the content-preferred consumers is always higher (lower) than for the shopping-preferred consumers when the selling conversion rate of traffic is low (high). Furthermore, a lower traffic cost coefficient does not always result in a lower product price in a centralized setting compared to a decentralized setting. Only a higher traffic cost coefficient will lead to a lower price in a centralized structure compared to a decentralized setting. Finally, we design a two-part tariff contract and a wholesale price rebate contract based on traffic with fixed transfer payments. Our findings fill a gap in the supply chain coordination literature. Moreover, we provide marketing strategies for suppliers on selecting LSEs and for LSEs on positioning consumer preferences, while offering firms a to coordinate contract options.