Evolutionary game analysis of security technology investment strategies in data product supply chains

In the era of data-driven production and services, the elevation of data to a production factor has become a defining feature of the digital economy. However, insufficient investment in data security technologies has led to efficiency losses and trust deficits, which in turn hinder the generation and transmission of data value. Building a secure and controllable large-scale data market, together with appropriate mechanisms for sharing security technology investment costs, is a fundamental prerequisite for unlocking the value of data. To address this issue, this study investigates the evolutionary strategies of security technology investment in data product supply chains. Primarily, a three-layer theoretical framework comprising an ontological layer, an actor layer, and a technological layer is constructed to explain how security technologies are embedded into the processes of data resourcization, productization, and marketization, and how they interact with value transmission in data product supply chains. Based on this, a tripartite evolutionary game model involving suppliers, service providers, and demanders is developed. The model characterizes the security strategy portfolios of the three parties, derives the payoff matrix and the corresponding replicator dynamic equations. The local stability of equilibrium points is then analyzed using the Jacobian matrix and eigenvalues, and numerical simulations are conducted to examine the effects of key parameters. The results show that, first, security technology investment has a dual role in risk mitigation and value enhancement, and its positive externalities significantly reduce the costs of service providers and improve system stability. Second, asymmetric risk sharing, internal incentive–penalty mechanisms, and the security sensitivity of the demand side can substantially alter the basins of attraction of different equilibria. A threshold effect exists, reflecting diminishing marginal returns to security technology investment costs, and the positive externalities of security technologies significantly reduce the costs of service providers and enhance system stability. Finally, by adjusting the cost structure, benefit allocation, and risk-sharing mechanisms, the tripartite system can evolve toward a high-security stable equilibrium, thereby achieving Pareto improvements.