Relative Reality Theory: Degrees of Reality, Validity, and Stability in Fragmented Knowledge Environments

Contemporary debates in philosophy, science, media studies, and technology are increasingly shaped by conflicts over what counts as real. These conflicts are frequently framed as contests between realism and relativism, objectivity and construction, facts and narratives. This paper argues that such oppositions conceal a more fundamental problem: the absence of a coherent framework for distinguishing modes and degrees of reality. Relative Reality Theory (RRT) develops a systematic account of reality as a graded and mode-specific status rather than as an absolute property. Reality is understood as a function of experiential immediacy, intersubjective stability, and functional efficacy. On this basis, RRT reconstructs distinct modes of reality, subjective, intersubjective, and functional reality, without dissolving them into a unified ontological hierarchy or reducing them to mere opinions. RRT provides a conceptual framework for analyzing real-world phenomena such as scientific models, media realities, political narratives, simulations, and virtual environments. By clarifying the conditions under which something can count as real in a given sense, the theory avoids both ontological absolutism and arbitrary relativism. It provides tools for identifying category mistakes, resolving apparent conflicts of reality, and understanding why certain realities remain stable despite contestation. The paper positions RRT as a philosophical ordering framework rather than as an operative or technical theory of model management. Its aim is not to calculate or optimize reality claims, but to clarify their modes, scope, limits, and conditions of validity. In doing so, RRT contributes to contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science by providing a precise vocabulary for navigating reality under conditions of pluralism, mediality, and systemic complexity.